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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-
102(3)(j), as Appellant Kennedy Funding, Inc's ("Appellant") petition for interlocutory 
appeal was granted on December 8, 2009. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j); Utah 
R. App. P. 5. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erred when it determined that, pursuant to Utah 
Code Title 38, Chapter 1, a contractor can enforce a lien against private abutting lots for 
paving work that it performed on dedicated public roads. Requiring interpretation of the 
mechanic's lien statutes, specifically Utah Code sections 38-1-1 and -3, this is an issue of 
law, reviewed for correctness. See Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage 
Mountain Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("The construction 
of a statute is a question of law and thus we review the trial court's conclusion under a 
correction of error standard."); Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, ^ j 4,182 
P.3d 924 ("Inasmuch as the issues before us are limited to questions of law, namely, 
questions of statutory interpretation, no deference need be given the trial court's 
conclusions."). This issue necessarily requires this Court to determine whether the district 
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court incorrectly denied Appellant's motion for summary judgment while granting Appellee 
AT Asphalt Paving, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment, an issue of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. See Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, \ 6, 70 P.3d 78. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it incorrectly determined two issues of 
"undisputed fact," and then erroneously relied upon those and upon this Court's holding in 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), to 
conclude that Appellee could lien abutting lots. The district court's errors present issues of 
law that are reviewed for correctness. See Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Corntrol, Inc., 2007 
UT App 407, \ 31, 175 P.3d 572; Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, \ 6, 70 P.3d 78. 
These issues were preserved in the district court pursuant to Appellant's motion for 
summary judgment and its supporting memorandum, and in its memorandum opposing 
Appellee's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. See R.492-555; 713-64. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Statutes that may be determinative of this appeal are Utah Code sections 38-1-1 and 
-3. Each of these statutes is provided in its entirety in the Addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying case is a mechanics lien foreclosure action. Appellee seeks to 
foreclose its mechanics lien against 240 lots located in the 3200 Subdivision, Phase 2, located 
in Iron County. In the process of the foreclosure, Appellee seeks a declaration that 
Appellant's interest in the lots is inferior to the mechanics lien. 
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In September 1985, the plat for 3200 Subdivision Phase 2 was acknowledged and 
recorded with the Iron County Recorder. Twelve years later, in 2007, Appellant loaned 
$28,860,000.00 to the owner of the 240 lots, and took back security in the form of a trust 
deed in those 240 lots and in other real property. Beginning in August 2007, Appellee paved 
a portion of road within the 3200 Subdivision Phase 2, but was never compensated for this 
work. (R.978-80.) 
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with the district court, seeking a 
determination that Appellee's claim for mechanic's lien foreclosure could not succeed 
because its lien was invalid. (R.492.) Appellee filed a cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment asking the Court to declare that its work was "lienable against the lots abutting the 
dedicated road." (R.631-32.) 
On September 22,2009, the district court issued an order denying Appellant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and granting Appellee's cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R.977-1003.) Appellant filed its petition to file an interlocutory appeal on 
September 29, 2009 (R.1007), which petition was granted on December 8, 2009 (R.1063). 
The district court has stayed the underlying action pending the outcome of this appeal. 
(R.1071.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are set forth in Appellant's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R.494-96, each of which were undisputed, see R.63 7-640, 
and are recited verbatim below: 
1. The properties that are the subject of this dispute are located in Iron County, 
Utah, and are more particularly described as follows: All of lots 1 through 240 of 3200 
SUBDIVISION, PHASE 2, according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the 
Iron County Recorder. Parcel Numbers: D-0223-0002-0001 through D-0223-0002-0240 
(hereafter collectively "3200 Subdivision Phase 2"). See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, 
19. 
2. In September, 1985, the plat for 3200 Subdivision Phase 2 was made, 
acknowledged, and recorded with the Iron County Recorder. A certified copy of this plat, 
with the corporate acknowledgment, corporate dedication of all streets and easements, county 
acceptance, and signature of the Iron County Attorney, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. At all relevant times, Defendant Braffits Creek Estates, LLC ("Braffits 
Creek*') was the owner of 3200 Subdivision Phase 2. See Plaintiffs Amended Notice to 
Hold and Claim a Lien, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B; see also May 31, 
2007 Deed of Trust, relevant pages of which are attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
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4. At all relevant times, Defendant Omnia Development, Inc. ("Omnia"), was 
the general contractor relating to work being performed on the 3200 Subdivision Phase 2. See 
Deposition of Steve Barnhart, p. 5,1. 18-23, relevant pages of which are attached hereto as 
Exhibit D; see also Subcontract Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
5. In May 2007, Defendant Kennedy Funding, Inc. loaned the amount of 
$28,860,000.00 to Braffits Creek. See Promissory Note, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit E. This loan was secured by a trust deed relating to certain real property, 
including 3200 Subdivision Phase 2. This trust deed was recorded on May 31,2007 with the 
Iron County Recorder as Entry no. 553726, Book 1090, beginning page 875. See Deed of 
Trust, Exhibit C. 
6. Plaintiff A-T Asphalt Paving, Inc executed a Subcontract Agreement with 
Omnia dated August 15, 2007 for "installation of 2.5" of hot mix asphalt on all roadways in 
the Project." See Subcontract Agreement, p.3, f^ 2, Exhibit F. As defined in the Subcontract 
Agreement, the "project" "is Phase 2.1 of Braffits Mountain, legally described as 3200 
Subdivision, Phase II, Iron County, Utah, lots 74 thru 83, 117 thru 130, 142 thru 156, 161 
thru 177, 187 thru 202, and 210 thru 216." Id, p .3 ,^1 . 
7. Beginning in August 2007, Plaintiff paved a portion of road within the 
3200 Subdivision Phase 2, but was never compensated for this work. See Deposition of 
Darren K. Cottom, p. 47,1. 8-13, relevant pages of which are attached hereto as Exhibit G; 
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Deposition of Marty Victor Cottom, pp. 24-27, relevant pages of which are attached hereto 
as Exhibit H. 
8. In December 2007, Plaintiff filed with the Iron County Recorder's 
Office a lien notice for the amount due of $652,114.40, as entry no. 00564739. This notice 
was filed to include all lots within Phase 2 of the 3200 Subdivision. See Exhibit B. 
Certain additional facts were set forth by Appellee, entitled "Plaintiffs Statement of 
Additional Facts." (R.640-643.) With the exception of paragraphs (3) and (13) of Appellee's 
"Statement of Additional Facts," which were struck by the district court on the grounds of 
hearsay or because they were otherwise not factually supported, see Mem. Dec, pp. 4, 6 
(R.980, 982), the allegations set forth in Appellee's "Statement of Additional Facts" are set 
forth verbatim below1: 
1. The original developer of the 3200 Subdivision, Phase II ("3200 Phase 
II") dedicated the roads within the subdivision to Iron County when the subdivision plat was 
recorded in 1985. However, Iron County has never accepted the roads in 3200 Phase II for 
county maintenance because the roads were not built to county standards. Iron 
Countyconsistently told Braffits Creek Estates, LLC ("Braffits Creek") that the 3200 Phase 
'Most of the facts recited by Appellee in its "Statement of Additional Facts" are 
not relevant to the considerations at issue here, and were not referenced in the argument 
set forth by Appellee below. For instance, paragraphs 1, and 5 though 11, are irrelevant 
to the issue of whether the roads at issue were, in fact, dedicated, because this matter is 
controlled by statute, Utah Code section 17-27a-607(l), and there was no dispute by 
Appellee that the roads it paved were dedicated roads under that statute. See, e.g., Mem. 
Dec, pp. 2-3, 7-9 (R.978-79, 983-85). Nevertheless, these assertions are recited herein. 
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II roads would not be accepted for county maintenance. See Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, 
% 4, attached hereto as Exhibit 2; see also Affidavit of Steven Barnhart, f^ 11, attached hereto 
as Exhibit 3. 
2. Prior to the improvements by Braffits Creek, the roads were unimproved roads 
accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck2. See Affidavit of Stephen 
R. Piatt, Exhibit 2, ^ | 5; see also Affidavit of Steven Barnhart, Exhibit 3,^14, and Exhibit A 
and C thereto, which are illustrative exhibits of the condition of the roads before the 
improvements were made. Exhibits B and D illustrate the condition of the road at the same 
location depicted in Exhibits A and C, during 2006 as improvements were made. Id. Exhibit 
3 and Exhibits B and D thereto. 
4. The pavement provided by Plaintiff was an essential part of the development 
plan of 3200 Phase IL 3200 Phase II was planned as a high-end mountain community and 
Braffits Creek planned on selling the lots at a premium as they would be improved mountain 
lots with utilities. Without the pavement, there was no possibility of the development 
working financially.3 See Affidavit of Steven Barnhart, Exhibit 2, <J| 7, 12; see also 
Deposition of Steve Barnhart, pg 8, In. 9 through pg. 9, In. 4, and pg. 16 Ins. 3-14, attached 
hereto as Exhibit 4. 
2
 The district court misconstrued this factual allegation, as discussed more fully 
below at Section B.l. 
3
 Appellant disputed this allegation, as discussed more fully below at Section B.l. 
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5. Because the 3200 Phase II subdivision plat had been accepted in 1985, none 
of the modern requirements for accepting a subdivision plat were imposed on the original 
developer. See Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, Exhibit 2, % 7. 
6. Iron County did not request or contract with any group, entity, or individual to 
make improvements to the 3200 Phase II roads. See Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, Exhibit 
2, |^ 8; see also Affidavit of Steven Bamhart, Exhibit 3, ^ f 8, 9. 
7. The improvements of the 3200 Phase II roads were not done pursuant to the 
Procurement Code, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-1-101, et seq, or any request or award of any 
contract by the County. See Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, Exhibit 2, % 9. 
8. Stephen R. Plat, the Iron County engineer, did not know that Braffits Creek 
would actually cause the roads to be paved until he saw the road construction happening. See 
Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, Exhibit 2, If 10. 
9. Iron County issued no permits for improvements to the 3200 Phase II roads. 
Iron County did not inspect the roads. See Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, Exhibit 3 ,^11. 
10. Iron County has not received a bond or any financial guarantee for the 3200 
Phase II roads. See Affidavit of Stephen R. Piatt, Exhibit 2, ^ f 12; see also Affidavit of Steven 
Barnhart, Exhibit 3, ^ f 10. 
11. Although the 3200 Phase II roads were dedicated to Iron County in the 1985 
plat map, Iron County did not consider the road improvement from an ATV trail to a paved 
road with underground utilities an Iron County project, but instead viewed it as a private 
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project to benefit 3200 phase II and the owner of that subdivision. Nee \!V;- . 
R. Piatt, Exhibit 2 ^ 13. 
12. SOUK HI lln (0*1*1 lli.tl \\; i , \u\\\ A h) Plaintiff is not located 011 property 
d -'• • ' '^ -:* n!:M - i public roadwa> , but was instead located in private property 
owned by Braffits Creek Estates, LLC. Tlic intent was to am^hu >*u
 rii\d\,^ :<l .* 
were made. See Affidavit <>i Steven V\OUISC\J*M ;•;• < * '• . I B thereto; 
see also Alhdaul ml SU'\vn Bainharl l;\hibit 3, |^ 10. 
J Based on the default of the property owner, ,, t a n n * { \ cc i e 
developer, Omnia Developmen I fin "Hi S* pirmlvi IS, ,!uuK„ lln 1 ourt entered judgment 
! 1 flu; v iilin; of Ihr \s 011 and reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $732,029.96. See 
Court Docket. 
SUMMARY OF ARG111'Vl I'1 P IT? I 
Though there an: \\w iiii"li<ir al iv,iu' 1 * * nil \ppellant's motion for summary 
ludgnu n( .mil Appellee^ cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the issues at stake are 
the same. Specifically: 
1
 ""Htle ^_ < .iapK. ; .»: !x . . • . llienr^t 
SCL; I >visions therein "shall not uppi) to ain public 
structure or improvement.r" Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-1 1 The paving work at issue 
was performed on dedicated roads, which constitute a public structure 01 improvement 
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Under the plain terms of section 3 8-1-L this work is not lienable. The district court erred in 
applying the governing law when it ruled that, despite the plain language of section 38-1-1, 
Appellee's work on public roads was lienable. 
2. Pursuant to section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code, entitlement to a lien requires that 
work be perfomied "upon" the property to be liened. A contractor therefore cannot enforce 
a lien against abutting lots for work that it did not perform "upon" such property. Appellee's 
paving work, performed on dedicated public roads within a subdivision, cannot be liened 
against the abutting lots within that subdivision. The district court determined that, despite 
the clear language of section 38-1-3, and despite the undisputed fact that the relevant work 
was not performed upon the property liened here, Appellee was entitled to record a lien 
against abutting lots. This determination contravenes the language of the governing statute 
as well as interpretative case law. Accordingly, the district court erred when it denied 
Appellant's motion for summary judgment and when it granted Appellee's motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
3. The district court incorrectly determined that Appellee could lien abutting lots 
under the holding of First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 
521 (Utah 1979). In making this determination, the district court improperly relied on two 
issues of "undisputed" fact that were incorrect. To the extent this determination governed 
the district court's denial of Appellant's motion for summary judgment and its grant of 
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Appellee's motion for partial sun unary judgment, the district court erred and us i 
should be reversed. 
4. 1 tie holding in /• trs* ol I h vnv v h lor/gagc Investors should not be extended to 
c . •• • <M . • • : : • . - piaiii language of the Mechanic's IJen Statute does not allow 
for Plaintiffs lien, and Plaintiff had an alternate remedy in the form of a payment bond 
ARGUMENT 
A. ' THI\, PI AUN LANGUAGE ut n i E MECHANIC'S LIKN STATUTE DOES 
NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO LIEN ABUTTING LOTS FOR WORK 
PERFORMED ON PUBLIC ROADS. 
1. Work Performed on Public Roads is Not Lienable Pursuair 
Utah Code Section 38-1 * 
Theprovision , * ; .J : \ • • ie (hereafterthe "MechanicsLien 
J • i » r "ubhc building, structure or improvement." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1 :. The relevant paving work performed by Appellee was on a pumu .-.n -u •• 
improvement, to wit, dedicated roads. Accoi . i . iu . •s < n • * J aruc^ 
LienSldUik, litis uoil r
 M<1 luiuMr I! H" pi< -\ isions of the statute "shall not apply." la Hie 
(lisdml court erred iii :mplving the governing kiw when it mk/d that, despite the plain 
language of section 18 ; i Appellee's work on public roads was nenaoiL. 
5h;^ ..i'sprimar •.•*!»«• K^.I -.; (enactments is to give 
dTei ( - • .^ intent/ " DOI1, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co , 926 P.2d 
835,843-44 (Utah 1996) (quoting West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445,446 (Utah 1982)). 
"Generally, the best indication of that intent is the statute's plain language ^ 
1 A 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989)). Thus, this Court 
interprets a statute "according to its plain language unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute." Id. 
(citing West Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446); see also Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga 
Springs Development, L.L.C, 2002 UT App 300,1f 10, 57P.3d241 ("We will interpret and 
apply [a] statute according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable."); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672,676 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (same). The plain language of the Mechanic's Lien Statute dictates that the 
work performed by Appellee is not lienable. 
The plat for 3200 Subdivision Phase 2 was "made, acknowledged and recorded" in 
September, 1985. See Undisputed Statement of Fact No. 2, Mem. Dec, p. 2 (R.998). 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 17-27-607, this plat vested fee title of all streets therein to Iron 
County. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-607(l) ("Plats, when made, acknowledged, and 
recorded according to the procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all 
streets and other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for the 
public for the uses named or intended in those plats."); see also Plat (providing for perpetual 
dedication of "all streets and easements as shown on this plat"), Mem. in Supp. of Kennedy 
Funding, Inc.'s Mot. for Sum. Judg., Exhibit A (R.504). It is undisputed that Appellee 
performed the relevant work described in its mechanic's lien on these dedicated roads. See 
id, Undisputed Statement of Fact Nos. 6-8 (R.495-96); Mem. Dec, pp. 3-4 (R.979-80). 
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For purposes of the Mechanic's Lien Statute, an "improvement is one in \N 1111.111 here 
is "an annexation to 1 lie lantL.su that the niaknals in i|iici,i mi ran he pn>perl\ regarded as 
1!, i \ i n I.- i .. v •. : - i mst have been done w ith the intent of making 
it a pennanent part t he reo f King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co . 374 P.2d 254. 256 (T Ttah 
1962). Paving a road with asphalt falls within tin* definition. >,,'rpover. ;; ; e 
improvement" is "an improvemei it i i lade to p i • ' • v ; !] •» - "t' • >umical 
.xk's Law Diet., Deluxe Eighth Ed., p. 773. See also 
Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 p 2d 419. 422 i'=Tta1i 1090) (describing "public 
improvements" as "including streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks ^ e 
Ann § I/--7a-30<>( 4)(^)(II>( ( i (discussing (,\lreefs m UI'IMT ptib'h improvements"); id., § 
6 ill I 11) }i 1 7 M de fining term "public ly owned infrastructure and improvements" to include 
streets and roads). 
The paving at issue was performed on a public road ai id tl lei efoi e coi istitutes a "pi lblic 
impro\i n.. • ; • • anr^v." Utah Code Ann. § 38-
•-cause Iron County owns the roads in question, Appellee is •-! entitled l <• 
mechanic's lien for the work it performed on them. See id. 
Despite the undisputed, tacts '.ei loiih h n n n imi uir i. U m irrnv ni'ihe *M \^4M"HIMJ» 
.t.iluh itiir disli in i roiin drUTniinal that Appellee's work was, in fact, lienable. SeeMcm. 
Dec, pp. 8-10 (R.984-86). This ruling was not based on interpretation of the statute itself, 
but on policy considerations. The court determined that this statute protects agai 
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public property, see id., p.8 (R.984), and against liens arising from work under public 
contracts, id., p. 9 (R.985). The court ruled that section 38-1-1 did not apply because no lien 
was placed on public property (but on the privately-owned adjacent lots instead), and because 
this was a private rather than public contract. See id. Last, the court held that the legislative 
purpose of section 38-1-1 would not be served by applying it to the instant case. See id., pp. 
9-10(R.985-86). 
This analysis fails to take into consideration the plain language of section 38-1-1. 
That section, the very first section found in the Mechanics Lien Statute, does not discuss 
where a lien is ultimately filed or whether a government contract is in effect. Instead, it 
simply states that the Mechanics Lien Statute "shall not apply" to public improvements. 
Because the work at issue was, without question, a "public improvement," there is no room 
for further interpretation. "'There is nothing to construe where there is no ambiguity in the 
statute.'" Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672, 676 (quoting 
State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911,912 (Utah 1974). The district court made no finding that 
there was any ambiguity in the statute, or that the words were "unreasonably confused or 
inoperable." See Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C, 
2002 UT App 300, ^ [10 (statute must be interpreted according to its literal wording unless it 
is "unreasonably confused or inoperable."). Thus, the district court erred in going any further 
than the literal wording of the statute. Appellant respectfully urges this Court to reverse on 
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the basis that the district court erred in applying the governing law. See Berenda v. u;';^ > 
914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). 
2. Appellee Cannot Lien Abutting Lois For Paving Work lYiiormed 
on Public Roads Pursuant to Utah Code Section 38-1-3. 
Appellant argued below that, even if section 38-1 1 docs not necessarily preclude 
enforcement of Appellee's lien pursuant to section • ; '• -11 
a g a i n s t a d j a c e n t lot.s n >i - * • * -
 : K • fori i led oi i puhli' "<nd" \ppellee countered that, 
! «.»., .- M i • • ' • i • • language contained within that section, it was entitled to lien 
the adjacent lots. I he dislriu v.<»urt agreed with Appellee and determined ;:..n ^Ujaccn; luis 
could be Iiened for work perfomied on the public roads I Ins dclu mmation is toiilnn \ I o 
the language nl Ik Jafuk mid ihlnprrlntiu' < a\c lay<> and should be reversed. 
Si vf ion 38-1-3 states 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who 
have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, 
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service^ performed labor, or furnished or 
rented materials or equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished 
or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent. 
contractor; or otherwise except as the lien is barred under 
Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and ! -rv> 
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Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added). 
Per the plain language of this section, a lien attaches only "upon the property upon or 
concerning which [one has] rendered service." Id. Because mechanic's liens are "statutory 
creatures unknown to the common law," no benefits created by the statute are available 
unless there is "compliance with the statute." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and 
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986); see also Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 87 P. 
713, 716 (Utah 1906) ("a mechanic's lien is purely statutory, not contractual, and none can 
be acquired unless the claimant has complied with the several provisions of the statute 
creating the lien...where the statute fails, courts cannot create rights, and should not do so by 
unnatural and forced construction."). The work provided by Appellee was not performed 
"upon" the property it has attempted to lien. Moreover, Utah case law interprets the 
"concerning which" language as referring to particular artisans whose work necessarily is not 
performed "upon" real property. See below. Accordingly, section 38-1-3 does not provide 
a benefit to Appellee; it cannot lien property upon which it did not perform the work at issue. 
Acknowledging that it did not perform its paving work "upon" the lots it liened, 
Appellee argued below that section 38-1-3 allows a lien to be recorded when work "just con-
cern[s] the land." (Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiff s Cross-Motion for Sum. Judg. and in Opp. 
to Kennedy Funding, Inc's Mot. for Sum. Judg., p. 18) (R.654). The district court agreed 
with Appellee, ruling that "the current language of section 38-1-3 does not require, for the 
19 
attachment of a lien, that work performed for the improvement oi the ioi tx p.i i^rm... , 
the lot itself/ 'Mem. Dec., p. 25 •: nw\,..lowing A\\ <* «* i ?. 
which ' language. 
i« i.-niiuiation is contrary to Utah case law thai interprets the plain terms of 
section 38-i-_v I hi. ("nun h.i mice held 4hnt -he phrase "concerning whiu ; 
mechanics lien statute applies * ,i * .* viurn . • ^is * 5 
drawings ar * i j u ; ' a c l lb i u , ! "hvsically present on the property 
•- .,
 L j i e s e r v j c e s a r e provided, but the work itself is used i< > mak*. die improvements on the 
property: 
From the history and purpose of the statute u appears that the 
words 'upon or concerning which' were simply intended to be 
generally descriptive of the manner in which certain work and 
services are performed. For example, work done by contractors 
or laborers upon ar -• ' -ell or building is done upon the 
property, whereas, the services of architects and engineers is 
\\orl-. which m:n he regarded as done 'with respect to' or 
'concerning' ihe property. 
//<>//* i n\i IXUI />\m/. v 1 \n l\a 1 My] \> "M wH ;. 388-89 (Utah 1970) (quotingStanton Trans. 
Co. v. Davis, 341 i.ld 207, 210 (Utah 195())J (emphasis added). 
In reaching thai decision, this Court, noted that pnoi In Ihe eoiiipiLtdu , nil I l| h 
statutes in. IVJj. ineehanies liens had lum \ n* u\n\ im In 11 <• p,irnIe sections. Stanton 
Trans < "«"  e lhi\ 1» "Ml V 2d. at 209. I he section concerning architects, engineers and. 
artisans granted a lien against propert} to am * >m \\ h* had "bestowed labor in whole or part, 
describing, illustrating, or superintending such structure 01 w ui 1. .. u 
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part connected therewith " Id. at 210. The Court found that, "[i]n the consolidation with 
other sections, the cumbersome emphasized language was deleted and the more general term 
'or concerning' was inserted as a shorter substitute." Id, Thus, the phrase "concerning the 
property" is a descriptive term only, designed to provide a lien to certain artisans who work 
directly on the improvement, though the manner in which they perform that work is off-site. 
The district court found that each of these cases were distinguishable because the 
language of the governing statute had changed since these cases were published. See Mem. 
Dec, pp. 14-16 (R.990-92). This determination was incorrect. The key language in this 
section that describes what land may be liened - "shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which they have rendered service" - has remained in its identical form since 
Stanton and Carlson were decided. See Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d at 209; Zions 
First Nat. Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d at 388. 
Appellant's argument is buttressed by the fact that section 38-1-3 also provides that 
a lien "shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property" Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added). The "property" paved belonged to Iron County, not 
Braffits Creek; such work was not performed upon the abutting lots. Accordingly, the lien 
recorded by Appellee is not enforceable. See id. As set forth long ago by this Court, "a 
mechanic's lien attache[s] to the land, and, unless the person against whom the claim for a 
mechanic's lien is made has some interest or estate in the land upon which the improvement 
is made, no lien attache[s] to the improvement as such." Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 87 P. 
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at 715. "[I]n order to acquire a. lien, an interest in the real estate upon ^ IIK h lln unpick 
ments are made is necessary." Li *ii <' 10 I bi' i • « oir isinu v iili ihr pnveiiirii! language 
fount) in tin:, sect MM i 11 iiil ,illu\\ » lot a In ii 'npon the properh upon...'" one has rendered. 
service Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. 
There is no dispute that Appellee's work on the dedicated roads was not performed 
"upon" adjacent lot s. I here is no pro . i- ; . iu nen 
iihiiltifijj kind up' II i i ^«»i, *\T: not done. Hie district court's determination that 
Appellee may circumvent this requirement by looking to a \n < >\ Kh >n reserved for architects, 
engineers and the like is unfounded. Accordingly, ilie dislnel court erred when il held that 
Appellee is entitled to a mechanics hen against adj.tivnl lens lorwmk noi performed "upon" 
„ll i 11 | . ) | S . 
B. FIRST OF DENVER MORT. INVESTORS V. ZUNDEL & ASSOC'S DOES NOT 
ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO LIEN ABUTTING T OTS AND ITS HOLDING 
SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO DO SO 
1. • First of Denver Does Not Stand For the Proposition that 
Abutting Lots May Be Liened and the District Court Erred 
to the Extent it Held Otherwise. 
Appellee cited no direct Utah authority for its proposition that, despite the cleai ternis 
of sections 38-1-1 and '"», abutting lots an; IIK"\IT( he less Mibjeil In a lini lui pauni* work 
perloi nieil on pnhh. i >>AAI Instead Appellee relied heavily on First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). Appellee argued that First of 
Denver "decided the issue of whether lots abutting a road could be licikd Im I In 
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infrastructure improvements in the road/' Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiff s Cross-Motion for 
Sum. Judg. and in Opp. to Kennedy Funding, Inc's Mot. for Sum. Judg., p. 8 (R.644). No 
such ruling can be found in First of Denver. The issue of dedicated roads or other public 
property was not at issue nor mentioned in First of Denver. There was certainly no mention 
of whether paving work performed on dedicated, public roads could be liened against 
adjoining private lots. Instead, First of Denver dealt with water and sewer systems that were 
installed within the confines of a large subdivision, and whether such work should be 
considered "off-site" and therefore not lienable work. This Court ultimately determined that 
such endeavors were lienable as they were "necessary to make the residences to be built on 
such property habitable." First of Denver Mortgage, 600 P.2d at 525.4 
The district court acknowledged that "the improvement here - street paving - is not, 
strictly speaking, like water and sewer systems, which are 'necessary to make residences to 
be built on [the] property habitable/" Mem. Dec, p. 18 (R.994) (quoting First of Denver 
Mortgage, 600 P.2d at 525). Nevertheless, the district court determined that the paving work 
was lienable under the rationale provided in First of Denver Mortgage in light of "the 
4Other out-of-state cases relied on by Appellee also dealt with the question of 
whether sewage and water systems could be lienable, given that such systems "make the 
homes being constructed suitable for habitation." J.R. Christ Const. Co., Inc. v. Willete 
Associates, 221 A.2d 538, 541 (N.J 1966) (holding that such work was "required to make 
homes habitable," and was "necessary to make the homes...suitable for habitation."); see 
also Mitfordv. Prior, 353 F.2d 550, 553 (C.A. Alaska 1965) (same). These cases, like 
First of Denver Mortgage, do not address the issue before the Court - whether paving 
work performed on public roads can be liened against adjacent private lots. 
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undisputed facts that 1) the roads paved by Plaintiff were, prior to such paving, 'accessible 
only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck/ PL St. Add. Facts f 2, and 2) 
'[wjithout the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working financially/ 
PL St. Add. Facts |^ 4. " Id., p. 20 (R.996). This determination of facts had no evidentiary 
basis, and was improper. 
There was no undisputed fact (or any disputed fact, for that matter), that the roads at 
issue were largely inaccessible before Appellee paved them in 2007. To the contrary, it was 
undisputed by both parties that the roads had been excavated and graded prior to this time, 
and that they were quite driveable without any paving whatsoever. Appellee admitted that 
"most [of] the mountain subdivisions in southern Utah are dirt roads." See Barnhart Depo., 
p. 8,1. 21-22 (Exhibit 4 to Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiff s Cross-Motion for Sum. Judg. and in 
Opp. to Kennedy Funding, Inc's Mot. for Sum. Judg.) (R.682). The excavated, unpaved 
roads in Phase 2 looked just like the unpaved roads located in the previously developed and 
completed Phase 1 of this same subdivision. See Deposition of Steve Shrope, pp. 66-67 
(attached to Mem. in Further Supp. of Kennedy Funding, Inc.'s Mot. for Sum. Judg as 
Exhibit J) (R.737-38); Deposition of Gary Goodsell, pp. 73-74 (id., Exhibit K) (R.741-42); 
Deposition of Ronald Larsen, pp. 58, 147 (id., Exhibit L) (R.745-46); Deposition of Daren 
Cottam, pp. 40-41 (id., Exhibit M) (R.749-50); Shrope Depo., pp. 58-59) (R.735-36). 
Appellee had alleged that street improvements (necessarily excavation and grading) were 
performed in 2006, which was before Appellee's 2007 paving work that is at issue. See 
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Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiff s Cross-Motion for Sum. Judg. and in Opp. to Kennedy Funding, 
Inc's Mot. for Sum. Judg., p. 5 (R.641). Appellee itself put into evidence the fact that it was 
only before work began in 2005 that the roads were nothing more than ATV trails, that the 
subdivision roads were cut in and graded between 2005 and 2006, and that the roads were 
"later paved" by Appellee in 2007. See, id, Exhibit 3, ffif 12-15 (R.674-75). Thus, these 
roads were driveable prior to the installation of pavement. The district court's factual 
conclusion to the contrary was not urged by either side, and is unsupported by the evidence. 
It is undisputed that Appellee's paving work was not necessary to make the roads driveable 
or otherwise "habitable," so as to fall within the First of Denver rationale. 
So, too, does the district court's factual finding regarding the finances of the 
development lack an evidentiary foundation. The affidavit on which it was based was the 
unfounded and conclusory opinion of one person regarding the development plans and 
financial expectations of another entity, Braffits Creek. See Affidavit of Steve Barnhart, f 7 
(Exhibit 3 to Appellee's Mem. (R.637)). Appellant pointed this out to the district court at 
page 3 of its reply memorandum, R.715, noting that conclusory affidavits that contain only 
unsubstantiated belief rather than personal knowledge are insufficient on summary judgment. 
See Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, f 7, 18 P.3d 1137. The trial court relied upon it 
anyway, see Mem. Dec, p.4 n.3, which was improper given the absence of foundation for 
this particular assertion. 
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"On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed 
evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City 
v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,1100 (Utah 1995); see also Territorial Savings & Loan 
Ass 'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452,456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a trial court "must not 
weigh or resolve disputed evidence"). Indeed, "a challenge to a summary judgment presents 
for review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary 
judgment do not resolve factual disputes." Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 
1108,1111 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, the district court erred to the extent it determined that, 
based upon the two incorrect factual findings set forth above, the holding in First of Denver 
Mortgage allowed Appellee to lien adjacent lots.5 
2. The Authorities Provided By Appellant Below, Rather Than First 
of Denver\ Were Applicable to the Facts of This Case. 
Conversely, Appellant provided the district court with certain additional authority 
consistent with its argument that paving work on public roads was not lienable against 
adjacent private lots. For instance, in Shelby Contracting Co., Inc. v. Pizitz, 231 So.2d 743 
(Ala. 1970), the Alabama Supreme Court held that dedicated street improvements within a 
subdivision could not be liened against abutting lots. After recognizing the split of authority 
5It is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the district court relied on the 
holding in First of Denver Mortgage. While the district court indicated that "allowing 
Plaintiffs lien here is proper" under that decision, Mem. Dec, p. 20, it later held that the 
lien was proper under the language of section 38-1-3 itself. Id., p. 25. However, to the 
extent the district court relied on these two incorrect "statements of fact" for its 
conclusion that abutting lots were lienable, that decision was erroneous. 
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nationwide on the issue, the Shelby Court noted that decisions in favor of lien claimants 
rested on the proposition "that improvements constructed on the street entitle the 
mechanic...to a lien because the street is part of the abutting lot/' Id. at 746. The Shelby 
Court rejected this theory because in Alabama (like Utah) the dedicated street is not a part 
of the abutting lot. Citing Alabama's road dedication statute (which, like Utah Code section 
17-27a-607(l), states that recordation of an acknowledged subdivision plat grants the city 
title to the roads in fee simple), the Shelby Court held that any present "interest*' in the road 
was the same any other member of the public would enjoy: 
[S]o long as the 'street' exists, the interest of the lot owner in the 
'street' is merely the right to enter it and to use it in common 
with the rest of the public The lot owner cannot sell the 'street' 
or lease it or control its use by other persons or control the 
height of the surface or the nature of objects or material to be 
placed in or on it so long as it remains a 'street.' 
Id. at 750. The Shelby Court held that a lot owner's only "interest" in an abutting public 
road is, in essence, an "interest in the nature of a possibility of reverter," an interest so 
insignificant that no lien can attach: 
By whatever name called, the lot owner's interest in the street, 
at most, is a contingent expectancy dependent on an event which 
may never occur. We are of opinion that the better view is that 
the lot owner's interest in the 'street' does not make the 'street' 
a part of the abutting lot so that an improvement on the 'street' 
is an improvement on the lot so as to make the lot subject to a 
lien for such improvement. 
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This analysis is consistent with Utah law, which holds that an abutting owner owns, 
at best, a "reversionary interest" in a street. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Utah 1977). 
See also White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah 1952) C*[T]he Legislature did not 
regard the dedication to the public of a street in a platted subdivision as the surrender of an 
easement with retention of the fee to the corpus in the abutting owner."). At present, the 
abutting lot owners have no interest in the dedicated roads, as these roads were granted in fee 
simple to the County. See Ash, 572 P.2d at 1378 ("When the state took the property in fee 
simple, it would also be expected to take this reversionary interest."). As such, the Shelby 
analysis is applicable here, and prevents Appellee from liening abutting lots for work it 
performed on the dedicated roads. 
In addition, Appellant cited Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Sante Fe Land & 
Improvement Co., 332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958), wherein the Colorado Supreme Court 
examined a statute very similar to Utah's ("subcontractors...shall have a lien upon the 
property upon which they have rendered service") and affirmed a district court determination 
that public street improvements could not be liened against abutting lots. Id., 893-94. The 
Court held that the statute imposed "two limitations on the lien involved. First, it is granted 
only upon the property upon which the labor, services and material are bestowed or rendered; 
second, only to the extent of the value of the labor, services and material rendered upon the 
property" Id. at 894 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court determined that land upon 
which the road work was not performed could not be liened for such work: 
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By the statute...the lien is restricted to the land of the contracting 
owner, or his interest in it, at the time of making the contract, 
and is further restricted to the work done ' upon such land.' * * 
* the remedy by lien being purely statutory, and to be strictly 
construed, Johnston was powerless to charge lands of which he 
was not the owner, and in which he had no legal interest, with 
a lien, he was also equally powerless to charge his individual 
property with a lien for construction, improvement, and 
betterment of land belonging to others. 
Id. Like Shelby, this analysis applies to the instant case and buttresses Appellant's argument 
concerning application of section 38-1-3. 
Ultimately, the district court acknowledged the cases cited by Appellant, but rejected 
(either implicitly or explicitly) their application to this case due to the district court's 
interpretation of section 38-1-3. See Mem. Dec, pp. 20-25 (R.996-1001). Curiously, though 
the district court recited that the Brannan case was "distinguishable," it never said why that 
was the case. Mem. Dec, p. 20 (R.996). In regard to the Shelby case, the district court 
conceded that, "if the Court were required to answer the question posed in Shelby - namely, 
'whether or not an improvement, such as...paving...which is actually upon the street, is to be 
regarded as being upon the lot which abuts on the street'...the Court would likely be 
compelled to reach the same conclusion reached there." Mem. Dec, p. 24 (R.1000). 
However, the district court held that Shelby was not applicable because section 38-1-3 does 
not require work to be "upon" the property liened: "Because the language and purpose of 
section 38-1-3 support Plaintiffs lien claim, and neither Utah precedents nor those of other 
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states refute it, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is granted and [Appellant's] 
summary judgment motion is denied." Id., p. 25 (R.1001). 
As set forth above, the language of section 38-1-3 does not support the conclusion 
reached by the district court. Thus, the Shelby decision should have confirmed that 
Appellant's argument was correct. Moreover, because the plain language did not support 
Appellee's argument, there was nothing to "refute;" instead, the onus should have been on 
Appellee to set forth authority that could show why the statute should be expanded or 
enlarged. See, e.g., DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 844 (this Court 
interprets a statute "according to its plain language unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute."); 
Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C., 2002 UT App 300, 
f 10 ("We will interpret and apply [a] statute according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable."). Because no such authority was presented, the 
district court should have granted Appellant's motion for summary judgment under the plain 
terms of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
3. First of Denver Should Not Be Extended to Apply to This Case. 
The district court ultimately made a policy determination when it determined that 
Appellee was entitled to lien the abutting lots in question. See, e.g., Mem. Dec, pp. 18-20 
(R. 1004-06). This policy determination traverses a problematic course. The language of the 
statute mandates that work be performed upon the property to be liened. It does not speak in 
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terms of "benefits" provided. If this language is to be eschewed whenever work simply 
benefits certain property, the question raised is where to draw the line. Many different 
projects could fall within these parameters. The roofline of one residence in a subdivision 
could be redesigned so as to afford better views to the houses to be built on uphill lots; would 
the unpaid architect be able to lien the uphill lots? What if the work is arguably a detriment? 
Reasonable people disagree as to whether dog parks or public trails benefit or harm adjacent 
properties; is the work to build such an improvement lienable against the entire subdivision? 
Against adjacent lots? To avoid such arguments, the legislature has drawn the line with the 
words it has used in drafting sections 38-1-1 and 38-1-3- the work must be performed "upon" 
property in order to entitle someone to a lien on that property. 
This Court has already once expanded the scope of section 38-1-3 by allowing for a 
lien where work for work that is "necessary to make residences to be built on such properly 
habitable." First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 525. As set forth above, there is no dispute that this 
exception does not apply here. Appellant respectfully submits that this Court should not 
further expand the scope of this section to apply to the facts of this case, to wit, where work 
was not necessary to make residences on the adjacent lots habitable; indeed, the paving work 
was not even performed throughout the entirety of the subdivision. "Where statutory language 
is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative 
intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according 
to its plain language." Garrard v. Gateway Financial Services, Inc., 2009 UT 22, % 11, 207 
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P.3d 1227 (quoting Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685,686 (Utah 1989)). This rule should 
apply here. The statute, as written, is clear and prevents arbitrary or uncertain application of 
its provisions. 
There is no need to expand the provisions of the mechanics lien statute to protect the 
Appellee because had another remedy available to it. Appellee could and should have 
required Braffits Creek (the entity with whom it contracted) to obtain a payment bond. The 
Utah Code specifically provides for such protection, and provides a cause of action against 
an owner for failure to obtain a bond. See Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1, et seq. As set forth 
therein: 
Before any original commercial contract exceeding $50,000 in 
amount for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land is awarded to any 
contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor a payment 
bond: 
(a) complying with Subsection (3); and 
(b) that becomes binding upon the award of the original 
commercial contract to the contractor. 
Id, § 14-2-1(2). Section 14-2-2 then provides a remedy for failure of an owner to obtain a 
payment bond. See id., § 14-2-2(1). Particularly in light of the dollar amount of the contract 
at issue, this would have been an easy and sensible solution. 
The district court's policy determination that Appellee's lien is enforeceable should be 
reversed. Appellant respectfully urges this Court to apply the letter of the lien statute and to 
refrain from further expansion of the holding in First of Denver. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court and remand this 
matter with direction to grant Appellant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as against Defendant. Because it is undisputed that the work 
at issue was performed on dedicated roads, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and Defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
DATED this _^_ day of April, 2010. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Lesliej^an Frank 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Appellant Kennedy Funding, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
memorandum was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the ^ day of April, 2010, to the 
following: 
Lewis P. Reece 
Snow Jensen & Reece 
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B 
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
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N.A., an Arkansas National Association; 
KENNEDY FUNDING, INC., a New Jersey 
corporation; R&W EXCAVATING, INC., a 
Utah corporation; SCHWAB SALES, LLC, 
an Arizona limited liability company; and 
John Does 1-5, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT KENNEDY 
FUNDING, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080500072 
Judge John J. Walton 
On June 10, 2009, Defendant Kennedy Funding, Inc. ("KFI"), moved for summary 
judgment and filed a supporting memorandum ("KFI Mem. in Supp." or "KFI's Supporting 
Memorandum"). On July 8, Plaintiff A-T Asphalt Paving, Inc., filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment and a combined memorandum opposing KFI's motion and supporting its 
own ("PL Comb. Mem."). On July 17, KFI filed a combined memorandum further supporting its 
motion and opposing Plaintiffs, and requested that its motion be submitted for decision ("KFI 
Comb. Mem."). On July 31, Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion ("PL 
Reply"). On September 8, the Court heard oral argument on the motions. Having considered the 
parties' written and oral arguments, and the relevant law, the Court now denies KFFs motion and 
grants Plaintiffs motion for the reasons set forth below. 
BACKGROUND 
Except as noted, the facts below are undisputed. 
KFFs Statement of Facts 
1. The properties that are the subject of this dispute are located in Iron County, Utah, and 
are more particularly described as follows: All of lots 1 through 240 of 3200 SUBDIVISION, 
PHASE 2, according to the Official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Iron County Recorder. 
Parcel numbers: D-0223-0002-0001 through D-0223-0002-0240 ("3200 Phase 2"). 
2. In September 1985, the plat for 3200 Phase 2 was made, acknowledged, and recorded 
with the Iron County Recorder. A certified copy of this plat, with the corporate 
acknowledgment, corporate dedication of all streets and easements, county acceptance, and 
signature of the Iron County Attorney, is attached as Exhibit A to KFFs Supporting 
Memorandum. 
3. At all relevant times, Defendant Braffits Creek Estates, LLC ("Braffits Creek"), was 
the owner of 3200 Phase 2. 
4. At all relevant times, Defendant Omnia Development, Inc. ("Omnia"), was the general 
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contractor relating to work being performed on 3200 Phase 2. 
5. In May 2007, KFI loaned the amount of $28,860,000.00 to Braffits Creek. This loan 
was secured by a trust deed relating to certain real property, including 3200 Phase 2. This trust 
deed was recorded on May 31, 2007, with the Iron County Recorder as Entry no. 553726, Book 
1090, beginning page 875. 
6. Plaintiff executed a Subcontract Agreement with Omnia dated August 15, 2007, for 
"installation of 2.5" of hot mix asphalt on all roadways in the Project." As defined in the 
Subcontract Agreement, "'Project' is Phase 2.1 of Braffits Mountain, legally described as 3200 
Subdivision, Phase II, Iron County, Utah, lots 74 thru 83, 117 thru 130, 142 thru 156, 161 thru 
177, 187 thru 202, and 210 thru 216."1 
7. Beginning in August 2007, Plaintiff paved a portion of road within 3200 Phase 2, but 
was never compensated for this work. 
1
 Plaintiff admits this fact, but asserts that "the Subcontract Agreement was not executed 
on August 15, 2007, bu t . . . at a later time at the request of Omnia . . . on the representation that 
it was required in order for [Plaintiff] to be paid for the paving work on [3200 Phase 2]." 
"Plaintiff further disputes the legal conclusion that the project was limited to Thase 2.1f and 
alleges that that language was used after the fact to protect against Plaintiffs potential hen. 
Finally, Plaintiff disputes the implication that work done in 2006 and 2007, before [KFI] 
recorded its trust deed, did not improve Thase 2.V within the meaning of Utah's mechanic's hen 
statute even if some-although not all-work done during that period of time was off site." As an 
example, Plaintiff avers that "the road [it] paved in 2006 leading to phase 2.1 had no other 
destination but phase 2.1 and thus improved the value of phase 2.1 lots even though that work 
was off site." PI. Comb. Mem. at 3-4. 
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8. In December 2007, Plaintiff filed with the Iron County Recorder's Office a lien notice 
for the amount due of $652,114.40, as entry no. 00564739. This notice was filed to include all 
lots within 3200 Phase 2. 
Plaintiffs Statement of Additional Facts ("PL St. Add. Facts55) 
1. The original developer of 3200 Phase 2 dedicated the roads within the subdivision to 
Iron County when the subdivision plat was recorded in 1985. However, Iron County has never 
accepted the roads in 3200 Phase 2 for county maintenance because the roads were not built to 
county standards. Iron County consistently told Braffits Creek that the 3200 Phase 2 roads would 
not be accepted for county maintenance. 
2. Prior to the improvements by Braffits Creek, the roads were unimproved roads 
accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck. 
3. This fact statement has apparently been withdrawn. (KFI objected to it on hearsay 
grounds, and Plaintiff omitted it in its reply memorandum.)2 
4. The pavement provided by Plaintiff was an essential part of the development plan of 
3200 Phase 2. 3200 Phase 2 was planned as a high-end mountain community and Braffits Creek 
planned on selling the lots at a premium as they would be improved mountain lots with utilities. 
Without the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working financially.3 
2
 The omitted fact statement alleged that, "[a]t some time during 2005, Braffits Creek 
informed Stephen Piatt, the Iron County engineer, that it wished to make improvements within 
[3200 Phase 2], which improvements would include the paving of the roads within the 
subdivision." 
3
 Plaintiff has supported these statements by references to the affidavit and deposition 
testimony of Mr. Barnhart. KFI argues that "[t]hese allegations lack evidentiary foundation, as 
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5. Because the 3200 Phase 2 subdivision plat had been accepted in 1985, none of the 
modern requirements for accepting a subdivision plat were imposed on the original developer. 
6. Iron County did not request or contract with any group, entity, or individual to make 
improvements to the 3200 Phase 2 roads. 
7. The improvements of the 3200 Phase 2 roads were not done pursuant to the 
Procurement Code, Utah Code section 63G-1-101 et seq., or any request or award of any contract 
by the County. 
8. Stephen R. Piatt, the Iron County engineer, did not know that Braffits Creek would 
actually cause the roads to be paved until he saw the road construction happening. 
9. Iron County issued no permits for improvements to the 3200 Phase 2 roads. Iron 
County did not inspect the roads. 
10. Iron County has not received a bond or any financial guarantee for the 3200 Phase 2 
roads. 
11. Although the 3200 Phase 2 roads were dedicated to Iron County in the 1985 plat 
map, Iron County did not consider the road improvement from an ATV trail to a paved road with 
underground utilities an Iron County project, but instead viewed it as a private project to benefit 
Mr. Barnhart simply opines as to the development plans of another entity, Braffits Creek." KFI 
Comb. Mem. at 3. Plaintiff says that Mr. Bamhart's personal knowledge of such plans is 
demonstrated by the fact that 1) "Omnia was the managing contractor for site development and 
off-site development of Braffits Creek"; 2) "[Mr.] Bamhart's specific employment at Omnia was 
to 'organize [the] subcontractors, to do all the infrastructure for the project and to supervise the 
installation of [that] infrastructure'"; and 3) "[Mr.] Barnhart worked directly for James Fales, the 
same owner of Braffits Creek." In short, "[Mr.] Barnhart was not simply opining as to the 
development plans of another entity, but was actually employed to carry out the development 
plans and has personal knowledge of them." PL Reply at 2. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 
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3200 Phase 2 and the owner of that subdivision. 
12. Some of the road that was paved by Plaintiff is not located on property dedicated in 
the 1985 plat as a public roadway, but was instead located in private property owned by Braffits 
Creek. The intent was to amend the plat after improvements were made.4 
13. This fact statement is insufficiently supported to be considered.^ 
4
 Plaintiff has supported these statements by references to the affidavit testimony of Mr. 
Woolsey and Mr. Barnhart. KFI again challenges foundation, arguing that Mr. Barnhart's 
affidavit testimony here "consists simply of an unsupported conclusion," and that Mr. Woolsey's 
affidavit testimony is unsupported because he "was a surveyor; he did not engineer the roads 
within [3200 Phase 2]" and "'never provided any vertical control work for the existing roads.'" 
KFI Comb. Mem. at 6. Plaintiff stresses that Mr. Barnhart's affidavit states that it is based on 
personal knowledge, and notes that "[Mr.] Woolsey was the vice-president of InSite Engineering 
at the time InSite Engineering was retained to do survey work and other engineering work related 
to [3200 Phase 2]," and Woolsey's testimony is supported "with an AutoCAD drawing that was 
produced in conjunction with his work, and shows where the paved road varies from the 
dedicated road." Finally, citing Mr. Woolsey's deposition testimony, Plaintiff states that he 
"personally located the centerline of the existing road, lots comers, and conducted a survey of the 
property, giving him more than a sufficient basis to testify as to the location of the roadway." PL 
Reply at 3. Again, KFI's challenge is rejected. Even if Mr. Barnhart's affidavit fails to establish 
his competence to testify about the location of the pavement relative to the platted road, Mr. 
Woolsey's is clearly adequate. He is a surveyor who actually located the centerline of the platted 
road and certain existing property corners. 
5
 The omitted statement of paragraph 13 is: "Moreover, Plaintiff paved several private 
driveways to different lots within 3200 Phase 2." This statement is supported by reference to Mr. 
Barnhart's affidavit, which is equally unspecific. KFI argues that this evidence would not be 
admissible at trial, and is therefore insufficient on summary judgment, because "Plaintiff has 
provided no evidence as to what lots it purportedly paved, the cost of such work, or when such 
work was performed." Additionally, KFI "denies these allegations, as they are inconsistent with 
Plaintiffs Subcontract Agreement, which provides only for 'installation of 2.5" of hot mix 
asphalt on all roadways in the Project.'" KFI Comb. Mem. at 6-7. Plaintiff rests on Mr. 
Barnhart's employment with Omnia, "the managing contractor for both onsite and offsite 
development"; the long hours he worked "from August, 2005 through about November, 2007"; 
and his alleged personal knowledge. The Court agrees with KFI's position that this statement is 
inadmissible due to Plaintiffs failure to identify any of the lots where driveways were allegedly 
paved. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
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14. Based on the default of the property owner, Braffits Creek, and the developer, 
Omnia, on September 18, 2008, the Court entered judgment for the value of the work and 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $732,029.96. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties' competing summary judgment motions are predicated on the same basic 
issues, so this decision addresses the issues rather than the motions. 
Utah Code section 38-1-1's exclusion of public improvements from 
the mechanics5 lien statute does not make the paving of dedicated 
streets pursuant to a private contract nonlienable. 
Beginning with the premise that Utah's mechanics' lien law is expressly inapplicable "to 
any public building, structure, or improvement," Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, and noting that 
platted roads constitute public property, see id § 17-27a-607(l),6 KFI argues that Plaintiffs work 
paving the platted roads was a nonlienable public improvement as a matter of law. KFI cites a 
number of cases from other jurisdictions holding that public property is not subject to mechanics' 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."). Cf Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 
P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (existence of a roadway "was not a material factual issue" 
at trial where "[t]he evidence regarding the existence of a roadway was scant and was not 
seriously disputed by respondent," and in any event, "insufficient evidence was submitted to 
allow the court to find that the roadway was lienable work" because "[tjhere was no indication in 
the evidence as to who constructed the roadway or whether they would be entitled to a lien on the 
property"). 
6
 Utah Code section 17-27a-607(l) provides: "Plats, when made, acknowledged, and 
recorded according to the procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets 
and other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for the public for 
the uses named or intended in those plats." 
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liens. See Hydro Conduit Corp. v. American-First Title & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 712, 716 (10th 
Cir. 1986); North Bay Construction. Inc. v. City of Petaluma, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 462 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006); City of Westminster v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co.. 940 P.2d 393, 396 (Colo. 
1997); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & hnprov. Co.. 332 P.2d 892, 893 (Colo. 
1958); Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, 155 P.3d 952, 958 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
In response, Plaintiff does not challenge the proposition that mechanics' liens are not 
allowed on public property or for public improvements, but denies the applicability of that rule 
here. Plaintiff argues that Utah Code section 38-1-1 "is meant to address public construction 
projects as well as to protect public property from liens." PI. Comb. Mem. at 10 (citing Cox 
Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). In Cox 
Rock, the Court of Appeals explained that, because "subcontractors and suppliers are precluded 
under the mechanic's lien statute from placing a lien on 'any public building, structure or 
improvement,"' "suppliers and subcontractors have principally looked for protection to the 
second device, namely that of the payment bond, when providing labor or supplies for 
construction projects contracted for by governmental entities" IdL at 674 (emphasis added). 
Observing that its lien is not on public property, and that the work on which the lien is based was 
performed pursuant to a private contract rather than under any agreement with Iron County, 
Plaintiff argues that the work done here is not properly characterized as a public improvement. 
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Utah cases have explained that section 38-1-1 protects 
against liens on public property, see Geneva Pine Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 
1986) (noting that "the materialman is precluded under U.C.A., 1953, § 38-1-1 from placing a 
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hen on public property") (emphasis added and footnote omitted), and against liens arising from 
the provision of work or supplies under public contracts. See Western Coating v. Gibbons & 
Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 503-04 (Utah 1990) ("We have reasoned that since mechanic's lien 
protection is not available in public contracts, 'performance bonds are required on public 
projects to provide substitute protection for laborers and material providers.'") (quoting CECO v. 
Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989)); Cox Rock, 754 P.2d at 674. 
Neither of these circumstances is present here. Although the work here was technically 
performed on public property (or at least on property that was ultimately intended to be public),7 
no lien has been filed on any public property. Rather, Plaintiff filed its lien on all of the lots 
within 3200 Phase 2, which are privately owned by Braffits Creek. The lien did not arise from 
the performance of a public contract, but of a private one, the purpose of which was to enhance 
the value of Braffits Creek's private property. Although the public undeniably benefitted from 
the paving of a previously unpaved public road, the Court would have to close its eyes to the 
facts to categorize the paving as a public improvement. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how calling the paving project a public improvement 
would serve the legislative purpose of section 38-1-1. KFI itself asserts that "[t]his section 
codifies the common law exemption of public property from mechanics [sic] liens, the purpose 
of which was cto preserve essential public services and functions while protecting those who 
7
 It is undisputed that, insofar as Plaintiffs paving did not exactly follow the plat, "[t]he 
intent was to amend the plat [to reflect such deviations] after improvements were made." PL St. 
Add. Facts \ 12. 
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benefit from public services and facilities.'" KFI Mem. in Supp. at 4 (quoting City of 
Westminster v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 940 P.2d 393, 395 (Colo. 1997) (internal citation 
omitted)). Accepting this as a correct summary of the section's purpose, there is no reason to 
believe such purpose will be defeated or undermined in any way by the allowance of Plaintiff s 
lien. As Plaintiff points out, it has not liened the paved streets themselves and enforcement of its 
lien therefore poses no threat of interference with public passage thereon. PL Comb. Mem. at 13 
(quoting J.R. Christ Constr. Co. v. Willette Assocs., 221 A.2d 538, 542 (N.J. 1966) ("It has been 
suggested that allowing mechanics' liens for the construction of sewers under public streets 
would result in interference with the public's right of way if and when such liens were enforced. 
We think this view is based on a misconception. Enforcement of liens arising from the 
installation of sewers would not result in the sale of streets for private use. Rather, such liens are 
enforced by selling the land and buildings abutting the street, the land and buildings which 
benefit from the improvements.")). 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-3, the paving of dedicated 
roads pursuant to a private contract entered into by the owner of 
private property abutting the roads and for the purpose of enhancing 
the value of such property gives rise to a lien on such property. 
The parties emphasize different parts of Utah Code section 38-1-3 to support their 
respective positions on the issue of whether a lien for the work done on the roads may attach to 
the abutting property. That section provides: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
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designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property. 
Pointing to the final sentence of this section, which limits the attachment of liens "to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property," KFI argues that no lien for the work done on the 
roads may attach to the abutting lots because "[t]he 'property3 paved belonged to the county, not 
Braffits Creek; such work was not performed upon the abutting lots." KFI Mem. in Supp. at 5-6. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, focuses on the allowance of a lien for the "improvement to 
any premises in any manner," which lien shall be "upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service . . . ." Because the work Plaintiff performed concerned the abutting 
lots, Plaintiff argues that a lien on such lots is appropriate, and is not an "attempt[] to attach any 
more interest than Braffits Creek Estates, LLC has in the property that was directly benefitted by 
Plaintiffs work." PL Comb. Mem. at 18. 
KFI responds that "the Utah Supreme Court has twice held that the phrase 'concerning 
which' in the mechanics [sic] lien statute applies only to architects and engineers and the like 
who provide drawings and specifications, i.e., where the laborer is not physically present on the 
property when the services are provided but the work itself is used to make the improvements on 
the property," KFI Comb. Mem. at 12, and quotes the following excerpt from Zions First 
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National Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387 (Utah 1970): 
From the history and purpose of the statute it appears that the words "upon or 
concerning which" were simply intended to be generally descriptive of the manner 
in which certain work and services are performed. For example, work done by 
contractors or laborers upon an oil well or building is done upon the property, 
whereas, the services of architects and engineers is work which maybe regarded 
as done "with respect to" or "concerning" the property. 
Id, at 388-89 (quoting Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1959)). 
KFI repeats the observations made in Davis that section 38-1-3 incorporates provisions 
from what were, prior to 1933, four distinct sections; that the pre-1933 section relating to 
architects, engineers, and artisans allowed a hen for "bestow[ing] labor in whole or part, 
describing, illustrating, or superintending such structure of work done or to be done, or in any 
part connected therewith"; and that, "[i]n the consolidation with other sections the cumbersome 
emphasized language was deleted and the more general term 'or concerning' was inserted as a 
shorter substitute." Davis, 341 P.2d at 210. KFI concludes: 
Thus, the phrase "concerning the property" is a descriptive term only, designed to 
provide a lien to those who work directly on the improvement that is on-site, but 
the manner in which they perform that work is off-site. 
Plaintiffs work on the dedicated roads was not performed "upon" adjacent lots, 
and Plaintiff is not entitled to circumvent this requirement by attempting to fit 
within a provision reserved for architects and engineers. 
KFI Comb. Mem. at 13. 
In reply, Plaintiff denies that the phrase "concerning which" is applicable only to 
architects and engineers. It stresses that the excerpt above, which is found in both the Carlson 
and Davis cases, and which explains how the phrase should be understood, uses the term, "[f]or 
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example," when saying that "the services of architects and engineers is work which maybe 
regarded as done 'with respect to' or 'concerning' the property," indicating that the "concerning 
which" language does not apply exclusively to members of these professions. 
Plaintiff correctly notes that whether the "concerning which" language applied to the lien 
rights of claimants other than architects and engineers was not a holding or an issue in Carlson, 
which involved the work of an architect. PL Reply at 8. It summarizes Davis as holding "that 
the cost of transporting a drilling rig to the site of an oil well was not lienable," and says that "[a] 
closer look at [that] case reveals that the court's reasoning was concerned more with the 
remoteness of the benefit created to the land when the drilling rig was transported to the site." 
PL Reply at 8-9. Plaintiff recounts facts relevant to this aspect of the case, and distinguishes 
them from those present here as follows: 
The property owner entered into a contract to have his land drilled at a certain 
price per foot. The drilling company then hired another company to transport its 
drilling rig to the property. The owner of the drilling rig sought a lien for the 
transportation cost. The court stated that interpreting the "concerning which" 
language too broadly could result in opening "the door to unforeseeable risks for 
the property owner." However, this is obviously not a risk in the case before the 
Court. In this case, the owner of the property is the party that requested the 
paving work and having its property liened for the cost of the work was not an 
unforeseeable risk. Further, the fact that the roads were paved providing access to 
abutting lots, is open and apparent to all lot owners. This is not a fact like 
transporting a drilling rig, that may occur without the owner being aware that a 
separate bill or charge over and above the cost of drilling the well, might result. 
PL Reply at 9 (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff is correct in identifying the foreseeability of the risks for the property owner as a 
factor in the Davis court's decision, 341 P.2d at 210, and the Court agrees with Plaintiffs 
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conclusion-for the reasons Plaintiff has given-that this concern is absent here. Cf Graco Fishing 
& Rental Tools v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Utah 1988) (distinguishing Davis 
on this ground, and holding, "in light of the purpose of the mechanic's lien statute, preventing a 
windfall to property owners at the expense of equipment, material, and labor suppliers," that 
"reasonable transportation charges [for rental equipment] are lienable"), superseded by statute on 
other grounds as stated in Trench Shoring Servs. v. Saratoga Springs Dev., L.L.C., 57 P.3d 241, 
245 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
On the other hand, the Court agrees with KFI that, under Davis, the "concerning which" 
language of the statute may not operate to give contractors, subcontractors, etc. lien rights. The 
court clearly found the phrase "upon or concerning which" to be descriptive rather than 
prescriptive. See Davis, 341 P.2d at 210 ("From the history and purpose of the statute it appears 
that the words 'upon or concerning which' were simply intended to be generally descriptive of 
the manner in which certain work and services are performed."). 
However, in reaching this conclusion, as KFI observed at oral argument, the Davis court 
relied, in part, on language in section 38-1-3 that expressly limited the lien rights of contractors 
and subcontractors:8 
8
 The version of section 38-1-3 applied in Davis provided, in pertinent part: 
[1] Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing labor upon, or 
furnishing materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or addition to, 
or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land; [2] all foundry 
men and boiler makers; [3] all persons performing labor or furnishing materials 
for the construction, repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting 
works; [4] all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the prospecting, 
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A difficulty with [the hen claimant's] argument that the latter phrase ["or 
concerning which"] should be given such a broad application to the entire statute 
is that doing so would be at variance with the tenor of these statutes and 
particularly the words creating a hen for labor and matenals The hen given to 
contractors and laborers specifies the "performing labor upon, or furnishing 
matenals to be used m or repair building or improvement upon [the] 
land " If the more general phrase "or concerning which" were controlling as to 
that class of hen claimants, the specific language requmng the work or matenals 
to be upon the property would be idle verbiage 
341 P 2d at 210 (emphasis added) 
Contrary to KPTs assertion at oral argument that the relevant statutory language remams 
the same today, the current statute omits, among other things, the preposition "upon" emphasized 
in the above excerpt, and makes a hen available to "[contractors, subcontractors, and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or rentmg any matenals or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner " Utah Code Ann § 38-1-3 Since Davis specifically explamed that 
the now-omitted language "requirfed] the work or matenals to be upon the property," 341 P 2d at 
210, the Legislature's decision to remove such language appears to reflect an mtent to remove 
development, preservation or working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or 
gas well, or deposit [5] and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of 
cost, surveys or supenntendence, or who have rendered other like professional 
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a hen upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished matenals, for the 
value of the service rendered, labor performed or matenals furnished by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by 
his authonty as agent, contractor or otherwise 
341 P 2d at 209 (bracketed subdivisions added m Davis) 
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this requirement. 
Moreover, doubts in this regard may be resolved by resorting to the purpose of the 
legislation in question. See John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) ("When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and application of a statute, it is 
appropriate to look to its purpose in the light of its background and history, and also to the effect 
it will have in practical application.") (quoting Davis, 341 P.2d at 209). "The purpose and intent 
of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform 
the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement," Sill v. Hart, 162 P.3d 1099, LI02-03 (Utah 2007) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted), and "[l]ien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose." Id. at 1103 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Reading section 38-1-3 through this lens, there can be little question that the statute's 
current language, which covers the "improvement to any premises in any manner" Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added), is broad enough to include improvements not literally 
performed on those premises but performed adjacent thereto for the benefit of such premises and 
at the request of the owner of the premises.9 See John Wagner, 797 P.2d at 1125-26 (noting that, 
under Utah's mechanics' lien law, "the owner of the premises, at whose instance and for whose 
benefit the improvement is made, has been the one most likely to suffer loss") (citation 
9
 As Plaintiff has argued, its lien only attaches to Braffits Creek's ownership interest in 
the property liened, and is therefore consistent with the requirement that it "shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. 
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omitted).10 
This appears to be a matter of first impression in Utah. However, the Supreme Court has 
previously affirmed the lienability of work done largely, though not entirely, on property other 
than the property liened. In First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the court upheld the determination that the mechanics' hens held by those 
who "performed labor or furnished materials on various condominium units on the property" 
related back to the work done by one Child Brothers, Inc. ("Child Bros."), which "consisted of 
locating existing lines and putting in pipeline, water and sewer systems, and storm drains." Id at 
523. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the subsequent liens, "which relate[d] to specific 
structures," could not "relate back to the date of the commencement of Child Bros.' work," 
which the plaintiffs "characterize^] . . . as coff-site improvements,'" id at 524, the court 
explained: 
"The purpose of the lien statutes is to protect those who have added directly to the 
value of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon it," Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959). The 
broad language, "improvement to any premises in any manner," encompasses the 
instant case where sewer and water systems were installed on the subject property. 
It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' lien that the material or labor 
be furnished solely on a building structure or that the work be performed solely on 
the lot on which a building is being erected. We agree with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, which stated in J. R. Christ Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs., 
47 N.J. 473, 221 A.2d 538 (1966), that a contractor should not be barred from 
10
 Regarding the effect "in practical application" of allowing such a lien, John Wagner, 
797 P.2d at 1125, the Court has already stated that the foreseeabihty problems addressed in Davis 
are not present here, where the owner of the property liened specifically requested the 
improvements for the benefit of the property liened. 
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enjoying the benefits of the mechanics' lien statute where his work not only 
enhances the value of the developer's land, but is also necessary to make 
residences to be built on such property habitable. The court held that where a 
developer engages the contractor to install a sewer system for a subdivision 
project, the contractor, if he complies with required statutory procedures, is 
entitled to a mechanics' lien against the developer's property for the cost of labor 
and materials furnished. The New Jersey Court cited Ladue Contracting Co. v. 
Land Development Co., 337 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. App. 1960), in emphasizing the 
fact that water and sewer systems are essential to the comfortable and convenient 
use of dwellings and that it would be "turn[ing] the clock back to another century" 
to hold that such improvements are outside the terms of the lien statute. (Id. at 
585). 
Id at 524-25. 
It is true, as KFI contends, that the facts of Zundel vary significantly from those of the 
instant case. First, unlike here, in Zundel there was at least some work done on the liened 
property. This was recognized in the court's holding that "[i]t is not necessary to the attachment 
of a mechanics' lien that the material or labor be furnished solely on a building structure or that 
the work be performed solely on the lot on which a building is being erected." 600 P.2d at 525 
(emphasis added). In contrast, all of the work on which Plaintiffs lien is based was performed 
on property other than the property liened.l l Second, the improvement at issue here-street 
paving-is not, strictly speaking, like water and sewer systems, which are "necessary to make 
residences to be built on [the] property habitable." Id. 
Although, for these reasons, the instant case does not come within the confines of the 
11
 Plaintiff has shown that the pavement it laid did not precisely follow the road as 
platted, and argues that its work was therefore done, to some extent, on the private property 
liened. The Court is not persuaded that the technical deviation from the plat is a material fact, 
especially considering that "[t]he intent was to amend the plat [to reflect such deviations] after 
improvements were made." PL St. Add. Facts If 12. 
18 
Zundel holding, nothing in that case suggests that it represents the outer limits of Utah's 
mechanics' lien law. On the contrary, the rationale of the Ladue case quoted in Zundel extended, 
in Ladue itself, to the work of road paving. See 337 S.W.2d at 585 ("It is much too late in these 
modern times to embrace arguments that the items in [the plaintiff s] account ought not to be 
treated as essential to the comfortable and convenient use of the dwellings. Research has not 
discovered any Missouri precedent dealing with streets as subject or not subject to the hen 
statutes. But dwellings without streets for ingress and egress, without driveways, or without 
efficient sewer systems are just no longer constructed in urban areas. To hold that the items of 
[the plaintiffs] account are outside the terms of the lien statute would be to turn the clock back 
to another century.") (emphasis added). 
Other authorities likewise regard the allowance of liens for offsite water, sewer, and street 
paving work as sharing the same animating principles. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 
111 ^Construction that is essential to the convenient and comfortable use of a city lot is an 
improvement to the lot, and is an 'appurtenance' to the lot, even if it is outside the physical 
boundaries. Thus, liens have been allowed on property for pipes laid in the street for water or gas 
mains and sewers, as well as sidewalks and street paving, irrespective of whether the fee of the 
street is in the owner of the abutting lot.") (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); 5-38 Powell 
on Real Property § 38.14 ("Even if the improvement, such as sidewalks, a sewer line, or street 
paving, is not directly located on the owner's property, a lien has been recognized in the abutting 
owner's property that is directly impacted by these appurtenant improvements.") (emphasis 
added and footnote omitted). 
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Particularly in light of the undisputed facts that 1) the roads paved by Plaintiff were, prior 
to such paving, "accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel drive truck," PL St. Add. 
Facts K 2, and 2) "[w]ithout the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working 
financially," PL St. Add. Facts f 4, the Court concludes that allowing Plaintiffs lien here is 
proper. The improvement on which the lien is based not only directly impacted the value of the 
liened property, but, for the anticipated scale of development on the property, it was also 
"essential to the comfortable and convenient use of [the property]." Zundel 600 P.2d at 525.l2 
Finally, the Court distinguishes the only two arguably relevant cases cited by KFI. The 
first is Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & Improv. Co., 332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958), 
in which an individual contracted to have peiving done that ran over three separate pieces of 
property, which were respectively owned by the public, himself, and a third-party. When the 
subcontractor who performed the work was not paid, he filed a lien on the individual's land for 
the full value of the work. The trial court allowed the lien, but reduced it to an amount reflecting 
the value of the portion of the road traversing the individual's property. 
12
 KFI points to evidence that the majority of mountain subdivisions in southern Utah lack 
paved roads, see KFI Comb. Mem. at 3 (citing PL Comb. Mem. Exh. 4, Barnhart Deposition 
8:21-22), but it is not clear that the accessibility of those subdivisions is as limited as was the 
property here prior to Plaintiffs improvements, or that the financial viability of such 
subdivisions is comparably dependent on improvements like paved roads. In fact, Mr. Barnhart's 
testimony suggests the reverse; he mentioned the lack of paved roads in most southern Utah 
mountain subdivisions as part of an attempt to show why the planned development of the 
property here "was a very high-end development for this area." PL Comb. Mem. Exh. 4, 
Barnhart Deposition 8:13-14. In contrasting the planned development of this property with that 
of other southern Utah subdivisions, he testified that, in addition to lacking paved roads, "[m]any 
of the subdivisions in southern Utah don't have water to the lots," and "[a] lot of them don't have 
electricity and so forth." PL Comb. Mem. Exh. 4, Barnhart Deposition 8:24-9:3. 
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In its combined memorandum, KFI presents Shelby Contracting Co. v. Pizitz, 231 So. 2d 
743 (Ala. 1970), in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that an improvement done upon a 
public street pursuant to a private contract with the owner of the abutting property was not 
li enable against the abutting property. Little more detail is given about the facts of the case, but 
again, the law applied clearly varies from that of Utah. 
After quoting the applicable statute, which required that the work or materials supporting 
a lien be provided upon the land liened,14 the court framed the issue as "whether or not an 
improvement, such as curbing, paving, or pipe, which is actually upon the street, is to be 
regarded as being upon the lot which abuts on the street." IcL at 745. After surveying the law 
from nine other jurisdictions, as well as its own related cases and statutes, the court joined those 
courts answering this question in the negative. Id at 750. 
Although the cases discussed raised a number of issues, the primary difference the court 
noted between jurisdictions allowing a lien for work on a sidewalk or street to attach to abutting 
property and those denying such a lien was that those permitting it held that the owner of the 
14
 As quoted by the court, the relevant statute provided: 
Every mechanic, person, firm, or corporation who shall do or perform any work, 
or labor upon, or furnish any material, fixture, engine, boiler, or machinery for any 
building or improvement on land, or for repairing, altering, or beautifying the 
same, under or by virtue of any contract with the owner or proprietor thereof, or 
his agent, architect, trustee, contractor, or subcontractor, upon complying with the 
provisions of this article, shall have a lien therefor on such building or 
improvements and on the land on which the same is situated, to the extent in 
ownership of all the right, title, and interest therein of the owner or proprietor . . . . 
231 So. 2d at 744 (emphasis added). 
oo 
abutting property owned a fee interest to the center of the street.lD The court observed that, by 
statute in Alabama, acknowledging and recording a plat resulted in "a conveyance in fee simple 
of such portion of the premises platted as are marked . . . on such p la t . . . as donated . . . for any 
street," and that, while "[i]t is true that upon abandonment of the street, absolute ownership 
thereof will then finally vest in the owner of abutting lot," id at 750, unless and until that 
happened, "the interest of the lot owner in the 'street' is merely the right to enter it and to use it 
in common with the rest of the public." Id Hence, "the lot owner's interest in the street, at 
most, is a contingent expectancy dependent on an event which may never occur. We are of 
opinion that the better view is that the lot owner's interest in the 'street' does not make the 
15
 The court quoted language referring to such ownership in all but one of the cases cited 
by the lien claimant there. See 231 So. 2d at 745-46 (quoting Lewis v. Roach Manigan Paving 
Co., 184 S.W. 680, 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ("But whatever the rule may be in other states, we 
are of the opinion that, as it is settled in this state that a deed to a lot fronting on a public street 
and calling for such street, or else describing the lot by reference to a plat which shows that the 
lot abuts upon the street and was laid out with reference thereto, carries with it a fee-simple title 
to the center of the street, in the absence of some restriction in the deed, it follows inevitably that 
an improvement, such as the one in controversy in the present suit, was an improvement upon the 
entire lot, including that part which fronts upon the street and upon which buildings are erected.") 
(emphasis added); Leiper & Mills v. Minnie, 86 S.W. 407, 409 (Ark. 1905) ("Now, while the 
general public have an easement in sidewalks, and while the municipality controls them for the 
purpose of preserving this easement, yet the fee, under the law, is in the owner of the land 
abutting the public streets to the center of the street, and this ownership is absolute, subject only 
to the rights of the public to enjoy its easement over it, and to the public power of the 
municipality, as the agent of the public, to preserve this easement or highway.") (emphasis 
added); Ladue Contracting Co. v. Land Development Co., 337 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1960) (^'Appellant owned the land to the center of the street on which his property abutted, 
subject to the easement in favor of the public") (emphasis added and citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). The sole exception was Application of Bradwood Realty, Inc., 251 N.Y.S.2d 
315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), but the Shelby court categorized it with the others, apparently inferring 
that Bradwood was based on the same rationale as the others because Bradwood "quoted at 
length from the Ladue opinion." 231 So. 2d 746. 
23 
'street' a part of the abutting lot so that an improvement on the 'street' is an improvement on the 
lot so as to make the lot subject to a lien for such improvement." Id. 
Concededly, if the Court were required to answer the question posed in Shelbv-namelv, 
"whether or not an improvement, such as curbing, paving, or pipe, which is actually upon the 
street, is to be regarded as being upon the lot which abuts on the street," id, at 745-the Court 
would likely be compelled to reach the same conclusion reached there. As previously noted, 
Utah Code section 17-27a-607(l) provides: "Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded 
according to the procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and other 
public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for the public for the uses 
named or intended in those plats." Additionally, as KFI points out, Utah law, like Alabama's, 
"holds that an abutting owner owns, at best, a 'reversionary interest' in a street," which interest is 
contingent and conditional[.]" KFI Comb. Mem. at 11 (citing Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1378 
(Utah 1977) ("It should be observed that an abutting owner would own a reversionary interest in 
the street to its center. When the state took the property in fee simple, it would also be expected 
to take this reversionary interest "); White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah 1952) 
("[Upon dedication,] the county or city authorities are vested with the fee in the streets. Such 
ownership carries with it the right to use it for the enumerated purposes when, in their discretion, 
it bests serves the public interest. If the street should cease to serve any public interest, it may be 
abandoned and, in that case, the right to the use and control of the roadway would revert to the 
abutting owner . . . . " ) ) . It may therefore not reasonably be concluded, under Utah law, that any 
part of the street is an extension of the abutting owner's property. 
However, as previously stated, the current language of section 38-1-3 does not require, 
for the attachment of a lien, that work performed for the improvement of a lot be performed upon 
the lot itself. Thus, the question asked and answered in Shelby is, unlike there, not dispositive 
here.16 Shelby itself recognizes that the division of authorities on the abutting property question 
is attributable to variations in the applicable statutory language. See 231 So. 2d at 745. Because 
the language and purpose of section 38-1-3 support Plaintiffs lien claim, and neither Utah 
precedents nor those of other states refute it, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is 
granted and KFI's summary judgment motion is denied.17 
16
 Further, two of the cases excerpted in Shelby that rejected a right to hen abutting 
property relied, in part, on the fact that the improvements on the street were made pursuant to 
local law and were therefore for a public benefit rather than a public one. See Coenen & Mentzer 
v. Staub, 36 N.W. 877, 877 (Iowa 1888) ("[N]or was [the sidewalk] made for the benefit of the 
owner, but of the public, and was constructed by the owner, as we presume, in obedience to some 
requirement of the town government."); Seeman v. Schultze, 28 S.E. 378, 379 (Ga. 1897) 
("Paving the sidewalk is an improvement to the public street and facilitates the passage of 
pedestrians in front of the lot, but it cannot be said in law that it improves the real estate. It is 
made as much or more for the benefit of the public than it is for the benefit of the owner of the 
lot. . . . Paving is usually regulated largely by the municipal government. It either paves the 
sidewalk or requires the owner of the lot to do so."). Presumably, the Shelby court included 
these excerpts in its decision because it considered this reasoning relevant to the matter before it. 
In this case, this factor weighs in the other direction. Braffits Creek had the paving done for its 
own benefit. Iron County did not request that it be done and took no part in getting it done. 
17
 KFI has also argued that Plaintiffs only remedies are a claim against Braffits Creek 
under Utah Code section 14-2-2(1) for failure to obtain a payment bond, and a contract claim 
against Omnia, both of which remedies Plaintiff has already obtained by virtue of the default 
judgments entered against Braffits Creek and Omnia in this case. This argument is rejected. KFI 
has not cited any authority establishing that Plaintiffs' right to the paper remedies it has obtained 
by default judgment disqualify it for the security provided by a mechanics' lien. KFI has also 
sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-18. Given the Court's 
decision to allow Plaintiffs lien, KFI is not entitled to its attorney fees under the section cited. 
Lastly, it is noted that, at oral argument, Plaintiff withdrew an objection it had previously made 
25 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
1. A-T Asphalt Paving, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted; and 
2. Kennedy Funding, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this Z~L day of September, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
John J. Walton 
District Court Judge 
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LIENS 
Section 
38-1-7 Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property 
38-1-8 Liens on several separate properties m one claim 
38-1-9 Notice imparted by record 
38-1-10 Laborers and materialmen s lien on equal footing regardless of time of 
filing 
38-1-11 Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected—In-
structions and form affidavit and motion 
38-1-12 Repealed 
38-1-13 P arties—Joinder—Intervention 
38-1-14 Decree—Order of satisfaction 
38-1-15 Sale—Redemption—Disposition of proceeds 
38-1-16 Deficiency judgment 
38-1-17 Costs—Apportionment—Costs and attorneys' fee to subcontractor 
38-1-18 Attorneys' fees—Offer of judgment 
38-1-19 Payment by owner to contractor—Subcontractor's hen not affected 
38-1-20 When contract price not payable in cash—Notice 
38-1-21 Advance payments—Effect on subcontractor's hen 
38-1-22 Advance payments under terms of contract—Effect on hens 
38-1-23 Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, except for purchase price 
38-1-24 Cancellation of record—Penalty 
33-1-25 Abuse of lien right—Penalty 
38-1-26 Assignment of hen 
38-1-27 Preliminary notice to original contractor—Form and contents—Service-
Notice of commencement of project or improvement 
38-1-27 Construction notice registry—Form and contents of notice of commence-
ment, preliminary notice, and notice of completion 
38-1-27 2 Notice to subcontractor 
38-1-28 Notice of release of hen and substitution of alternate security 
38-1-29 No waiver of rights 
38-1-30 Third party contract—Designated agent 
38-1-31 Building permit—Construction—Notice registry—Notice of commencement 
of work 
38-1-32 Preliminary notice—Subcontractor of supplier 
38-1-33 Notice of completion 
38-1-34 Abuse of database—Penalty 
3 8-1-3 5 . State not liable 
38-1-36 Construction notice does not impart notice 
38-1-37 Application of Section 38-1-27 and Sections 38-1-30 through 38-1-36 
38-1-38 Lien notification 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Creer, A Brief Overview of Utah's Mechanic's CaAnon, Extraordinary Collection Proce 
Lien Law, 12 Utah B J 32 (March 1999) dureS-Part I, 6 Utah B J 13 (June/July 1993) 
HomeT and Burns, \5tah Construction Law 
Recovery for Nonpayment, 9 Utah B J 8 (May 
1996) 
§ 38—1—1. Public buildings not subject to act 
r
 The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any public building, structure 
or improvement 
Codifications R S 1898, § 1399; CL 1907, § 1399, CL 1917, § 3751, RS 1933 § 52-1-1, C 
1943, § 52-1-1. 
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§ 38-1-2 LIENS 
Library References 
Mechanics' Liens <®=>8, 35 to 52, 79 to 115 C J S Mechanics' Liens §§ 9, 30 to 42, 44 to 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 257k8, 47, 95 to 117, 245, 277, 282 
257k35 to 257k52, 257k79 to 257kl 15 
Notes of Dec is ions 
Construction and application 
Original contract 4 
Original contractor 3 
Owner 2 
Sufficiency of evidence 6 
Time for filing 5 
1. Construction and application 
In action by inland marine insurer, as subro-
gee of insured's rights, against supplier of liquid 
alum tank, that exploded and damaged the con-
struction, in which supplier claimed to be an 
insured "subcontractor" under the policy, trial 
court did not err in refusing to instruct jury that 
whoever shall do work or furnish matenais by 
contract shall be deemed an original contractor, 
and all other persons doing work or furnishing 
materials shall be deemed subcontractors, in 
that definition was taken from mechamcs' hen 
statute U C A 1953, 38-1-2 Jacobsen Const 
C o , Inc v Industrial Indem C o , 1983, 657 
P 2d 1325 Insurance <&=> 3526(1) 
2. Owner 
Purchasers of property were properly regard-
ed as owners within meaning of hen statute, 
and inasmuch as their agreement was directly 
with builder to render service in building of 
their home, it was an ongmal contract with 
him, and not a subcontract as builder claimed, 
so that where contract had been terminated 
more than 12 months before builder filed action 
to foreclose mechanic's hen, it was too late for 
builder to obtain benefit of his claim of hen 
U C A 1953, 38-1-2, 38-1-11 Roberts v Han-
sen, 1971, 25 Utah 2d 190, 479 P 2d 345 Me-
chanics' Liens <®=» 260(1) 
3. Original contractor 
Lien claimant will be characterized "ongmal 
contractor," for purposes of time to sue provi-
sions of mechanic's hen foreclosure statute, re-
gardless of function he performed in particular 
con5truction project, so long as his contract was 
with property owner U C A 1953, 38-1-2, 
38-1-11 For-Shor Co v Early, 1992, 828 P 2d 
1080 Mechamcs' Liens <2> 260(1) 
Building matenal supplier who furnished 
building matenais to owner of house on open 
account was "ongmal contractor" and was enti-
tled to hie mechamcs' hen within 80 days after 
last work was performed, and hen hied 62 days 
after completion was valid as agamst one who 
purchased house from owner U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
38-1-2 Smith Bros Lumber Co v Johnson, 
1967, 19 Utah 2d 107, 426 P 2d 811 Mechan-
ics' Liens <®=> 83, Mechanics' Liens <£=> 132(1) 
4. Original contract 
'Ongmal contract," within meaning of time 
to sue provisions of mechanic's hen foreclosure 
statute, is contract between owner and ongmal 
contractor U C A 1 9 5 3 , 38-1-2, 38-1-11 
For-Shor Co v Early, 1992, 828 P 2d 1080 
Mechanics' Liens <3=* 260(1) 
5. Time for filing 
Untimehness of subcontractor's hen action is 
evaluated with reference to ongmal contract, 
typically, contract between owner and general 
contractor, under which subcontractor per-
forms pursuant to his subcontract with general 
contractor U C A 1 9 5 3 , 38-1-2, 38-1-7(1), 
38-1-11 For-Shor Co v Early, 1992, 828 P 2d 
1080 Mechamcs' Liens <3=» 260(2) 
6. Sufficiency of evidence 
In action on mechanic's hen filed agamst 
property of corporation and others, evidence 
supported conclusion that plaintiff performed 
work at the instance of corporation under an 
express or implied contract, thus, the hen was 
valid U C A 1953, 38-1-2, 38-1-3 Dugger v 
Co*, 1977, 564 P 2d S00 Mechanics' Liens <SP 
281(3) 
§ 3 8 - 1 - 3 . Those entitled to lien—What may be attached 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, esti-
mates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
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professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property 
upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service ren-
dered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting 
by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred 
under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in 
the property. 
Laws 1911 , c. 27 , § 12; L a w s 1973, c. 7 3 , § 1; L a w s 1981 , c. 170, § 1; L a w s 1987, c. 
170, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 3 0 8 , § 3 . 
Codifications R.S. 1898, §§ 1372, 1381, 1382, 1397; C.L. 1907, §§ 1372, 1381, 1397, C.L. 1917, 
§§ 286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747; R.S. 1933, § 52-1-3; C. 1943, § 52-1-3. 
Cross References 
Liens against residence or owner's interest, restrictions, see § 38-11-107. 
Private contractors bonds, see § 14-2-1 
Wrongful hens, see § 38-9-2. 
Law Rev iew and Journal Conimentaries 
Creer, A Brief Overview of Utah's Mechanic's 
Lien Law, 12 Utah B.J. 32 (March 1999). 
Library References 
Mechanics' Liens <s=»8, 15, 22 to 34, 35 to 54, CJ .S . Mechanics' Liens §§ 9, 14 to 48, 95 to 
79 to 115. 117, 245,277,282. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 257k8; 
257kl5; 257k22 to 257k34, 257k35 to 
257k54; 257k79 to 2 5 7 k l l 5 . 
Research References 
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46 A.L.R.5th 1, Landlord's Liability to Third 
Parry for Repairs Authorized by Tenant. 
N o t e s of Decisions. 
Annexation or benefit to real property, nature Form of contract or consent, necessity of con-
of improvement 10 tract or consent 21 
Appurtenances, nature of improvement 12 Implied contract or consent, necessity of con-
Architects, persons entitled to lien 24 tract or consent 20 
Authority to contract or consent, necessity of Improvement, alteration or repair, nature of 
contract or consent 17 improvement 9 
Capacity to contract or consent, necessity of Improvement outside building, nature of im-
contract or consent 19 provement 14 
Construction and application 2 Jury questions 35 
Effect of payment 29 Machinery, nature of improvement 11 
Effect of sale, property or interest subject to Materialmen, persons entitled to lien 25 
lien 7 Materials prepared or furnished, but not used, 
Entry of satisfaction of record 37 nature of improvement 15 
Exception of pre-existing liabilities and liens Mines, property or interest subject to lien 5 
33 Nature of improvement 8-15 
Extent of land affected, property or interest In general 8 
subject to lien 4 Annexation or benefit to real property 10 
Fixtures, nature of improvement 13 Appurtenances 12 
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